

FEELING THE WEIGHT OF THE WORLD

And thus, too, for that whose form presents it as a statement, there is always still the question whether it really contains an assertion. And this question is to be answered in the negative when the requisite seriousness is absent. (Frege 1918: 63)

Here we must be careful not to think in traditional psychological categories. Such as simply parsing experience into seeing and thinking; or something similar. (*Last Writings I*, §542)

Belief is a demanding attitude. It imposes one sort of discipline, as represented at the most general level, but not exhausted, by what Frege called the laws of truth. It imposes another by the requirement (argued elegantly by Frege) that its objects—*what* is believed, thoughts in Frege's terminology—must be something which an open-ended range of thinkers *could* believe, doubt, disbelieve, etc. It is intrinsic to a belief to be shareable. A corollary to this is that it is only *of* what is part of an environment—a habitat accessible, open to, an open-ended range of thinkers—that there could *be* things to be believed (truly or falsely, not just believed-in). Belief is also demanding in another sense: where it occurs at all, it presents itself as what one is *compelled* to; as forced on one by something, under whose influence one thus is. To see one's hand as thus forced is to *be* under the influence of something. To be under such influence, I will suggest, is to access—be presented to—oneself in a special way; one in which (as Frege put it) each of us is presented to himself alone. It is to be presented to oneself as a believer. And, I will suggest, to be so presented to oneself is to *be* a believer. Belief thus exemplifies a special sort of way of standing towards oneself. If it *exemplifies*, one might ask after the other examples. I will conclude by scouting, briefly, the possible scope of this way of standing. But all that follows is just preliminary probing in an area left to future work.

Moore's Paradox, so called, is a good entrée into the special form of access I have in mind. It is not really a paradox. It is more an anomaly in need of explanation. I will call it 'Moore's anomaly'. Its present interest, I will suggest, is that it is only explainable by supposing that in belief we do stand to ourselves in that special way I will set out below. I will suggest this, then move on to a more general characterisation of the way, and consequences for what is so presented to us.

A note on shareability. Frege argues for this in arguing that no thought could be a *Vorstellung*, in his sense of 'Vorstellung' (see 1918: 67-68). In essence this means: a thought cannot need a bearer—some thinker but for whose entertaining of, or having, it it would not exist—and it must allow two thinkers of it, or for any given thinkers of it, more. The corollary then becomes: no thought's truth can turn *essentially*, for some *Vorstellung*, on how that *Vorstellung* is, all the less, on whether it is thus and so. There are no 'thus-and-so's for a *Vorstellung* to be. As Frege himself is quick to stress, this does not rule *Vorstellungen* out of our inner lives. There is, for one thing, a trick, in evidence in Frege's own example, pain. For me to experience pain (for me to feel it) is for me to experience (feel) *my* pain, which again expands into: me experiencing my being in pain. On the one hand, only I can feel *that* episode of pain. For me to feel it is for that pain to be presented to me in a way it could be presented *only* to me. So in feeling pain I have a *Vorstellung* in the meaning of the act. But for the pain to be so presented to me is just for *me* to be presented to myself—my being in pain to be presented to me—in a way each of us is presented to himself alone. So now the other hand. *My being* in

pain is not a *Vorstellung*. It belongs to our cohabited environment. You, and others, can experience it too. You can experience just that, if not in the way I do. Truth is thus made to turn on what is accessible to many (if to any), as truth always must. Where I stand towards, or am presented to, myself in a way only I could manage, things must work like this if there is to be a question of truth at all—if I am genuinely to stand towards, or be presented with, my being thus and so. Such is Frege's message for philosophy of mind. Here belief seems to follow suit. The believing which I encounter while under the influence—while believing that P—that particular instance of it—is *my* believing that P. So my encountering that believing, and its being presented to me as it is, is also my encountering a certain bit of environmental history, my believing that P. Only I could have that believing presented to me as it thus is. But you need not be me to encounter the environmental episode which is also thus presented to me. Whether *that* episode instances some given generality—notably, whether it is one of someone believing such-and-such—does not (cannot) turn on whether some *Vorstellung* is thus and so.

The question is then how, in the case of belief (or in any case fitting the above pattern) what is presented to me in that way only I could manage relates to that which you need *not* be me to encounter—the pain to my being in pain, the believing as only I encounter it to my believing such-and-such. Dr. Lauben's injury (see Frege 1918: 65) is presented to him in a way each of us is presented to himself alone. So too (see Wittgenstein 1958:66) Ludwig is presented to himself in a way each of us is presented to himself alone in being presented with the wind blowing his hair. This does not make belief, or pain, *much* like being injured or having wind-blown hair. For one thing, whether Dr. Lauben's gash is deep or shallow is independent of how anyone—even Dr. Lauben—*responds* to what he is presented with. Whether it is excruciating promises to be otherwise in this respect. So too may whether he *believes* that it is deep. These last cases thus offer something else to take over *some* work reserved in the first sort for the environment alone. For another, hallucinating the wind blowing your hair is, while improbable, an unproblematic idea as such. Whereas it is difficult to make sense of the idea of hallucinating *believing*, e.g., that *Chez Fred* has changed its menu. Someone might be presented, in a way he is presented to himself alone, with a ringer for the wind blowing his hair. It is at best difficult to imagine one being presented with a ringer for his believing that *Chez Fred* has changed the menu—especially in some way he is presented to himself alone. I think this points to a crucial feature of that channel, what I will call its creative nature. But only later will I explain that use of 'creative'.

The data admit a spin which can make it seem all too easy to imagine ringers for me for my believing that *Chez Fred* has changed the menu. Such, I will suggest, is the wrong spin. Section 3 discusses this.

1. The Anomaly: First, a distinction. There is representing things *as* being such-and-such way; and there is representing them *to* be that way. The first is a wider category than the second. If, e.g., I represent things to be such that if Sid still snores, then Pia will leave, then in doing so I *eo ipso* represent things *as* being such that Sid still snores. I represent things *being* that way as the condition on which Pia will leave. But I do not represent things *to be* that way. On that I remain (officially) neutral. When I represent things *to be* such that Sid still snores, I assign that way a certain status: being a way things are. In that conditional above I assigned that way a different status, the one just mentioned. There are countless statuses I might assign that way in representing things *as* so being, each a way of representing-as without representing-to-be. (The 'things' in 'way for things to be' here bears catholic reading: there is no question which things.)

While we are on the topic, such *assigning* a way for things to be a status cannot be just more representing-as—e.g., representing it *as* having that status. The way's having this status could *also* be assigned any of many statuses. If we think of a thought as, grammatically, the thought *that* such-and-such, then the thought, so thought of, presents *that such-and-such*—that way *for* things to be—*as* being a way things are. But it does not commit to it so being. Thoughts—abstractions as they are—cannot commit. A thought thus cannot represent-to-be. If assigning a status were just more representing-as, a thought *could* assign statuses. But the *thought* that for Sid to snore is among the ways things are is just more representing-as. It can be the object of a wish, or antecedent of a conditional, just as well as any other thought. So, to borrow a phrase from Frege, if we represent a way for things to be as having such-and-such status, the game (here *assigning* status) can just begin anew. Such is the point of distinguishing between *content*—the way things are represented *as* being—and force—whatever that new element is where status is assigned. The boundary between the two may be moveable, but the distinction is one we need. It still remains, of course, to say what force comes to.

*These preliminaries are worth delaying the proceedings over because they will be of the greatest importance for understanding Moore's anomaly, and, thereby, that form of access to oneself which I mean to investigate here. Now for the anomaly. It starts from this idea: a way for things to be—a specifiable way they might intelligibly be—is a way they might be represented to be. Normally, anyone who grasped what it would be for things to be that way could represent things so to be. Roughly this is one thing intrinsic to that objectivity which Frege insisted on for thoughts. Moore points to an exception. Most of us suppose there are, or might be, some things we take to be so which are not so. Each of us grasps what it would be for him to take something to be so which is not, or for there to be something so which he does not take to be. Such happens often enough. As a rule, then, for a way for things to be—say, such that it is cherry season—we can grasp what it would be for it to be cherry season while we thought it was not, or for it not to be while we thought it was—two perfectly possible ways for things to be. Each of us can represent things to *have been* that way, or to be a way things *will* be at some future date. But we cannot (unproblematically, at least) represent such things to be a way things *are*. Such is the anomaly. It calls for explanation. How *can* it be that there is a perfectly possible way for things to be, which anyone other than me could perfectly easily represent to be a way things are, but which I cannot (or not unproblematically)? *Mutatis mutandis* for you.*

Representing things as being a certain way might be a case of thinking something. Or it might be a case of saying something. Thinking is fundamental here. If it were saying, then it should be that while *I* cannot (unproblematically) say of myself that I think that, while it is cherry season, I do not think it is, *you* should be able to say this of me. But saying it of me is, in fact, equally as problematic for you as for me. You say, 'He thinks that, while it is cherry season, he does not think so.' But the problem is, how can someone think *that*? What would count as doing so? Without answers to those questions, we cannot see what to understand you as having said of me. Still, the situation is strange. You can unproblematically think of me that, while it is cherry season, I do not think so. I cannot. Why the difference?

2. Filling The Space: Moore's anomaly shows in stating it what an explanation of it would have to look like. There is no difficulty in one merely representing things as being those (for him) anomalous perfectly possible ways. The difficulty is only in representing things *to be* those ways. So the explanation must lie in the space between representing-as and representing-to-be. It must be that, in the vexed cases, *nothing* lies in that space: whatever

would be needed for filling in the space, there is no such thing as that in the particular cases to which Moore points.

Where this space *is* filled, it is filled by *force*: for a speech act, the force with which representing is *produced*, offered; for an attitude, the force with which the attitude is held. Force, I have suggested, can be understood as the assigning of a status. For a speech act, I think, such assigning can be understood in terms of assumption of responsibility; of liability to successes or failures, to praise or blame, of certain specific kinds. For the present this is as may be. For an attitude to assign a way for things to be some given status would be for that way to *enjoy* that status in the doings, and/or thinking, of its holder.

For belief, perhaps the simplest way to think of this is, to borrow a Kantian image: the way enjoys that status in one's attaching an 'I think' to the *thought* of things as that way. It is for one to make that way of thinking of things *his* way of thinking. The point of that image here—that attaching an 'I think'—emerges in the way in which to believe something—to hold a view as to its being cherry season, or there being a Porsche in the drive—is, at the same time, to hold a view of, or stance towards, oneself—again such view or stance *not* consisting in mere representing-as. Equally, to be *presented* with the view one has from his position *in re* it being cherry season, or there being a Porsche in the drive, is to be presented with a view of oneself. Two different notions of a view in holding, and in being presented with one. Which raises a question to which I return at section's end.

Such assigning of a status—such a holding of a stance, at the same time towards a way for things to be and towards oneself—can be viewed from two sides—to borrow another pair of images, from the side of introduction (assuming of the stance) and elimination (the the stance in operation). I begin with introduction. Here perhaps the most striking feature of belief: one cannot *choose* what to believe—or at least in believing one cannot so see himself. Pia might tell Sid, 'I prefer not to believe that you would do such a thing.' But if as she sees herself such preferences are not already irrelevant—if it is not anyway decided what she *must* think as to Sid's having done it—then the condition she is in is *ipso facto* neither believing that he did nor that he did not. In belief one sees the world as having so impressed itself on him that his hand is forced—to borrow yet another fitting image (this time from David Wiggins), in the matter at hand there is nothing else for him to think. Stare at Pia's Porsche in the drive and *try* to believe there is no Porsche. The very suggestion makes no sense. The Porsche's presence convinces you, or (if you are firmly enough into fantasy) does not. Either way, there is no fixing things up by trying.

To believe is to be under the sway, or influence, of something: (one's encountering of) things being as they are. To be under such influence is to *feel* it—to feel compelled to think as one thus does. One might think of belief in this respect as Lutheran: one so stands towards things, unable to do other. But such felt compulsion must be of a special kind. To understand the kind is to understand how fitting an image 'the only thing to think' is. It must be what one is presented with—that which, in belief, one recognises, or misidentifies, as a case of things being thus and so—which one sees as doing the compelling, and not anything proprietary to one's particular way of responding to this. It must not be *psychological* compulsion that one sees himself as under. If Sid sees himself as so longing for Pia that he would take *any* Porsche for hers, and, while so seeing himself, feels overcome with an irresistible urge to take that Porsche in the drive for hers, such, again, simply is not thinking that *Pia's* Porsche is in the drive.

What other sort of compulsion might there be? To judge, or, in present terms, believe, is,

Frege tells us, to pursue the goal truth. Suppose you see a Porsche in the drive and know one when you see it. Then, (*ceteris paribus*) for you, to think otherwise than that there is a Porsche in the drive would simply not be pursuing the goal truth. For you, then, in this position, thinking otherwise would not be thinking-so (believing) at all. So thinking is *thus* ruled out for you. Such is thus the way one must see himself—the sort of compulsion he must see himself as under—to be believing that there is a Porsche, *or* that there is not one, or that the question is still *sub judice*. Feeling rational force is, of course, unlike feeling centrifugal force on a carnival ride, or the force of the gale impeding one's headway. There is no bodily sensation of rational compulsion. Nor would any psychological tugs or temptings fill the bill here, though feeling, or finding, oneself with nothing else to think manifests itself psychologically, e.g., in those feelings of bad faith one would suffer in saying other than what one is compelled to think.

Turning to elimination, Frege's idea also connects believing with pursuit. Believing that Sid snores is pursuing the goal truth *in re* whether Sid snores. To believe that Sid snores is, moreover, to shape one's general pursuit of truth accordingly. Pursuing truth differs from mere attraction to views which happen to be correct as *rushing* forward differs from moving forward at a rapid pace. One *holds* himself in pursuit. In matters of truth, one holds his forming, and holding, of views to a certain standard. In rushing forward one *maintains* momentum. In pursuing truth one maintains due respect for, and gives due respect to, the mattering of what matters, and the not-mattering of what does not. Believing that P, in its elimination guise, is guiding one's pursuit of truth—thus of *any* goal—accordingly; accepting that P as *the* guide (so far as it goes) to the thing to do or think. To believe that P is, where one sees P's being so as what *would* bear in a certain way on whether Q (or whether to do Q), to take the world thus to *bear* on whether Q, or to do Q. Belief is, *per se*, what so eliminates.

To believe that Porsches are fast is to see oneself as (rationally) compelled (by the world) to pursue the goal truth accordingly. Is to *see* oneself as so compelled to *be* so compelled? Is to *be* so compelled to *feel* this? If I think that it is cherry season, I may just be misinformed, or not know the signs of cherry season, or how to tell whether it is. In that case, I may think that it is cherry season while the world does not in fact make that the thing for *one* to think in pursuit of the goal truth. But the benighted must pursue truth benightedly. If I am (mistakenly) quite sure that Meireles would not be drinking *espumante* had cherry season not begun (in fact, he is only drinking it because, for him, the statute of limitations has just expired), then, unless his *now* drinking it disabuses me of this view, *I* can do no other than think cherry season to have started. *One* could do better. But for one in my benighted position, that it is cherry season is the only thing for one to think. Conversely, all the signs may be that it is cherry season, so that anyone with an ounce of sense would so think. But if I do not see these signs as forcing *my* hand, *my* pursuit of the goal truth does not yet require *my* thinking that it is. Being and feeling thus merge here.

I introduce the next point via a comparison. For me to feel pain is for me to experience *my* being in pain. I am thus presented with that very thing which might also be presented to others, but here in a way available to me alone. I *can* also experience my being in pain in ways available to others—e.g., by watching my grimaces in a mirror. One *could* say: I then also experience my pain in these ways. Now, where the one thinking it is cherry season is *me*, that thinking of this is presented to me (among other ways) in a way accessible to me alone. It is so presented to me in that attaching of the 'I think' which I thus realise. This, too, might be presented to me in other ways as well. I may stand back and observe my eagerness to reach Resende.

Suppose that I now see myself as others see me—observe myself believing what I do as others might—while under the influence of that which forces a particular course from me in pursuit of the goal truth. I thus observe myself being under the influence. I might be watching a video of myself. I *need* not even recognise it as a video of me. I might see what, seen in another, would make me take that other for one who thought that it was cherry season (or who did not). But suppose that, while thus seeing myself, I see myself otherwise in that way I am presented to myself alone. Watching the picture of myself, I would say, ‘There is the very picture of a man who thinks it is cherry season.’ But while doing that I do not see myself with nothing else but that to think. Presented to myself as one is in feeling rational compulsion, I see thinking that it is cherry season as what, for me, would not be pursuing the goal truth. For me to see myself as in such a position just is, despite the video, what counts as my *not* thinking that it is cherry season. Given what it is to think something, my special form of access to my believing—that access I enjoy just in attaching that ‘I think’ to that way for things to be (such that it is cherry season) plays, and must play, such a special role in settling what it is I think. Only then can thinking-so *be* pursuing the goal truth. I do not mean to overestimate that role. But it is at least this. The modesty in this claim will emerge in the next section.

I cannot, while seeing nothing else for me to think, treat the question as open whether so to think. Nor can I treat the question as closed without believing. That I can suspend belief and reconsider is beside the present point. So while I see myself in such position, there is no further question as to whether I thus think the thing in question—a question that might go one way or the other, depending on further considerations of some kind, presented in ways one need not be me to enjoy. My *seeing* nothing else for me to think, my thus attaching an ‘I think’ to some way for things to be, fills in that space in belief between representing-as and representing-to-be. My so seeing myself is my *having* nothing else to think. So it just *is* my believing things to be the way in question. My view of myself thinking as I do is in this way decisive. If I so see myself, the question *what* to think (*in re* whether it is cherry season), is settled for me. Further considerations cannot *decide* it for me in one way or the other. Thus the ineptness (noted by Wittgenstein) of reasoning, ‘I believe it, and I am reliable, so it is (probably) the thing to think (I’ll believe it).’ (See, e.g., 1980: §§482-483.) Thus it is that my seeing nothing else for me to think, as my thinking that it is cherry season, cannot be what settles for me whether it is cherry season.

Where experience *mediates* between our attitudes and their objects, where it works to make our attitudes *responsive*, sensitive, to how things are, the rule is that things factor as follows: there is, on the one hand, that with which we are presented for responding to; and there is, on the other, our responses. So it is in perception. I see the pig wallowing; I *recognise* it as a pig wallowing, thus think it that. As already mentioned, the word ‘view’, in use above, has a place on both sides of this distinction. There is the 35th view of Mt. Fuji, from a certain piece of shoreline. Then there is the dim view I take of pedagogues. Such double usage runs through the vocabulary used here for spelling out that attaching of the ‘I think’ to a way for things to be which I am presenting as, in the case of belief, filling that space between representing-as and representing-to-be. In thinking that Pia drives a Porsche, I am presented with myself in a certain condition—with nothing else to think. Is it *I* who am doing the presenting? Or am I presented with this by other means? Again, I see, or find, myself having nothing else to think. ‘See’ is here, anyway, not (literally) a *perceptual* verb. But is this seeing mere seeing-as (as Sid may be alone in seeing himself as a great wit)? Or is it, like the perceptual seeing, a success-verb, so that one *sees* himself only in conditions he is in fact in? ‘Feel’, too, has double uses. Feeling hurt, or insulted, by Pia’s snub is different from feeling the

spilled soup seeping through one's trousers.

On what side of this distinction does that self-awareness stand which we enjoy in so standing towards an attitudes as to confer on it that force with which we stand towards a way for things to be in *believing* things so to be—in *seeing* nothing else for us to think, in *feeling* rationally compelled to pursue truth in no other way? Is this *presentation* with something to respond to? Or is it a *response* to what we are presented with—what foists compulsion on us? A reasonable question, so far ducked. At this point we might recall that remark of Wittgenstein's (*Last Writings* §542). Perhaps we have here reached a point where we must abandon such traditional categories as presentation and response (ones which fit so well seeing what is before one's eyes and thinking it a pig). Here we might say either, or both, not incorrectly. Such is the present suggestion. It remains to be seen just where and how widely Wittgenstein's idea applies. Belief, though, presents a clear case. Hence, I suggest, Wittgenstein's interest in Moore's anomaly.

[[In fact, to focus on the verb 'feel', the notion of belief calls for elements of both readings. On the one hand, belief just is pursuit of truth. But it can be that only where one feels his stance as forced on him, his course as set, by pressure from without. It must be (in his view of things), what is thus external, independent of the idiosyncratic in his makeup, which leaves him nothing else to think. The Porsche in the drive, and not his wish for one, must be (at least as he views things) what forces his hand *in re* a Porsche being present. So there is feeling in the sense of feeling something pressing on one. On the other, there is that 'I think' attaching to belief: to belief that P is to make that P part of one's thinking as to how things are. So one must feel where feeling is pure response, feeling as thinking in a certain way as to the thing for him to do. To believe that P is to accord the world the status of bearing for one on questions of the thing to do (or think) as it would if P. There are the caveats. A believer is one *sufficiently* responsive, sensitive, to the demands of pursuing truth—to the course in fact forced on him by the pressure from without. But, if the above is right, for such a being, to feel as though pressed into a course just is to be so pressed—even when one seems to feel pressure there is not. On the elimination side, one may accord the world a status while blind to *some* features of what such status would entail.]]

In any event Moore's anomaly is now explainable. As we saw, the trouble must be that in such a case there is no such thing as making the relevant representing-as into representing-to-be. Sid can certainly represent things *as being* such that, while it *was* cherry season, he thought it was not. If that is how things were, he might think, he would be missing out. But he cannot take it to be *so* that, while it is cherry season, he thinks it isn't. Trouble arises for him in filling in that space. He would, to begin with, have to stand towards that first conjunct in a way which *was attaching* that 'I think'. He would thus have to see himself as with nothing else to think, as with hands thus tied in pursuing truth. Thinking that it is cherry season must be what he sees as required for him to be thinking (*in re* that matter) at all. Then and only then is he *thinking* the first conjunct.

Now to think the second conjunct he must (trivially) see himself as not thinking it is cherry season. But he so sees himself only in seeing himself as not compelled so think—in fact as compelled to think otherwise (even if otherwise is just that the question remains open). To believe, to repeat, is to see *oneself* in a particular way. What he cannot do here is to see himself as seeing himself as with hands untied—so it is with the one he thus observes—while, at the same time, for his part, seeing his hands as tied. There is no *such* separating oneself from himself.

Believing the anomalous conjunction, though—according *it* the status as part of *his*

thinking as to the thing to do (and think)— requires seeing himself in both these ways at once. Just this is what would fill the space between representing-as and representing-to-be when it came to taking such a conjunction *to be so*. But, when spelled out, there is clearly no such thing as that. Moore's anomaly is thus explained in just the form we knew at the start such explanation must take. Still, there is a perspective from which this explanation can seem wrong. I turn to that next.

3. Blindness: The connections drawn so far between believing that P and seeing oneself as set out above account for Moore's anomaly—if they exist. But there have been worries as to whether they really can exist, generated largely, I think, by the possibility of blindness to one's thinking as he does—to missing facts as to (as it may sometimes be put) what it is one 'really' thinks. But such possibilities, I will now suggest, are compatible with those connections drawn in the present idea of believing such-and-such as attaching an 'I think' to it.

The opportunity for blindness lies in the fact that believing is a *state*, or, otherwise put, an *interval* notion: it is the sort of thing that has an onset, perhaps an extinction; or at least it is continuous between given intervals. It thus presents the epistemic perils of any interval notion. At any point, or in any small enough interval, one may take himself (just as he may take another) to be within an interval of the relevant sort—here to believe—when he is not: the right things are not so of any large enough interval surrounding the occasion of his so taking himself. For the moment, it may be to him just as though he were in an interval of the relevant sort, while he is not. Equally conversely: he may take himself not to be within any relevant interval—so it seems at the point, or in the sub-interval—while he in fact *is* in such an interval—does, in fact, believe. So, in this way, one may not believe something while failing to see that he does not, or believe something while failing to see that he does. That intervals, so far as they go, allow for such situations does not by itself mean that they are possible. Something else about belief in particular may rule them out. But a great deal of effort has been spent in recent times in arguing that such possibilities are not ruled out—I think with some success. So I will take them not to be ruled out *tout court*.

What problems would this make for the present idea of believing as attaching an 'I think'? The core idea here would be this: if I fail to see that I believe that P, then I fail to feel the relevant compulsion so to think, or so to shape my thinking in pursuit of truth. I do not accord *that P* the relevant status in my thinking, make it relevantly mine. I do not attach to it that 'I think' scouted above—while, for all that, I do believe that P. Conversely, where I fail to see that I do not believe that P, it seems to me, at least, that I *do* thus attach the relevant 'I think'—that I am compelled to think no other. And, I have suggested, its being for me just as though I am rationally compelled is my being so compelled (however benightedly I may thus be pursuing truth). Then, too, if I am aware that belief allows for such possibilities, I may always suspect myself to be in such a situation, wherever it seems to me just as though I have, or have not, attached a relevant 'I think'. So—it *seems*—believing that P and attaching the relevant 'I think' to it are entirely independent.

An example may help keep us on track here. Mine will not be particularly convincing. But it will illustrate the structure of the idea. Sid would tell anyone if asked—with all the sincerity he ever musters—that Pia is an expert driver. He even tells himself this, with conviction, from time to time. Yet somehow Sid always seems to find reasons to avoid riding with her, or, when they do travel together, always arranges somehow for it to be he who drives. When this is pointed out to him, reflecting on what accounts for it, he comes to see that,

really, he does not think that Pia is much of a driver; he was only fooling himself in conjuring that sincerity with which he once said otherwise. (The scales are fallen from his eyes.)

As I have portrayed things, the root of the problem lies in the nature of intervals, or interval phenomena. The possibilities these make for extend *very* widely. Which shows that they are not always *problems*. I stand at the stop watching my bus approach. I *take* myself to see the bus approaching. But approaches occur over intervals. It is conceivable that, as I so take myself, the ‘bus’ disappears into thin air. I have seen no bus approaching if I have seen only what might have been (but was not) one momentary stage of this. Or I witness, or so I think, dinner being served. But as I take my first bite the whole thing disappears. Such are logical possibilities. But they do not rule out seeing the bus pull up to my stop, or witnessing dinner being served. Similarly, that I *might*, on occasion, be blind to how things (really) stand with me *in re* belief does not rule out that I should sometimes just see what it is that I believe (‘see’ here not a perceptual verb).

But dissolutions of our apparent problems with the idea of the ‘I think’ do not lie in this direction. For the epistemology that thus goes with interval phenomena, just as that which goes with the presence of opaque objects—aubergines, say—is necessarily occasion-sensitive. Sometimes I may count as simply seeing a penguin before me, and thereby *knowing that* a penguin is before me. But sometimes I would not so count. Sometimes a ‘penguin’ really *might* be a ringer. What penguins are makes room for this. Similarly with serving dinner. Similarly with belief from a third person perspective. Sometimes we can just *see* that Sid still believes that his wallet is in his pocket as he reaches for it to pay the check (we having just watched it artfully being lifted therefrom). But sometimes that momentary slice of Sid’s life proves misleading when set in a larger interval. (His ‘reach’ was a signal for the police to move in.) So we really saw no such thing as his so believing. So it would be from a first person perspective if, as per above, Sid really could believe that P while feeling his hand not forced in that direction, or vice-versa. So the epistemology which generally fits intervals and moments or sub-intervals must not fit the relation between believing that P and such attaching to it of an ‘I think’.

The first thing to observe here is that, while believing that P is an interval phenomenon, so is the relevant attaching of an ‘I think’. Or at least this is so if believing that P is attaching such an ‘I think’. What is needed, if believing and attaching the ‘I think’ are connected as per the last section is that in any given case the two intervals must be co-extensive. That is, the vicissitudes of Sid’s thinking that penguins waddle, or that Pia’s Porsche is in the drive across any interval in which he does so think must also be those of his attaching the relevant ‘I think’—of his feeling compelled, in the relevant way, so to shape his pursuit of the goal truth. So, e.g., Sid’s blindness to his not believing that Pia is an expert driver must also be blindness to his (relevantly) seeing himself as *not* bound to think none other than that she is. And his seeing himself as bound to think none other than that she *is* an expert driver—insofar as that is how he sees himself—must be co-extensive with his *thinking* that she is. But, in the case sketched, how can *all* this be so? Must not Sid either see himself as relevantly bound to think that Pia is an expert driver, or not so bound?

To see what it might be for things to be like that, we need to keep in view the occasion-sensitivity of belief. Such is a special case of an entirely general phenomenon. Here is a philosophically less sensitive case. As we enter *Chez Fred* in Beaujeu, we observe a waiter setting a plate of *salade de museau* in front of Pia. Did Pia really order *salade de museau*? Well, what do you mean by *ordering*? Tongue-tied, she asked Sid to speak for her. But yes, *museau* is what she wanted. Ordering *could* be understood in a way on which it is something Pia thus

did; or, again, in a way such on which it is something she did not. So the answer to the question is liable to depend on the point of, or occasion for, asking it. Absent point or circumstance, the best answer is, perhaps, 'Yes and no', a form of response which, in most cases, is rightly understood as: *you could say yes, and you could say no, all depending on how you understand ordering*. Thus a thumbnail sketch of occasion-sensitivity in general.

Now substitute believing for ordering. One sort of case which then comes to mind is this. As Sid is putting dinner into the oven, Pia phones to say that she will be home late—an extra person was needed for dinner with the speaker. Sid turns off the oven, opens a beer, and settles in front of the TV. He has no doubts as to Pia's fidelity, nor hence, as to her doing what she just said. As the two teams are coming out onto the pitch, though, he is suddenly gripped by agonising scepticism. Pia's story now seems to him a mere cover. Images of her trysting with Vic upstairs at La Bellota Hermosa now fill his mind, driving out all other thought. All of which rages unabated until stopped by a whistle. The game starts, Sid's scepticism melts away. At half time, enjoying the new steamy commercial for shampoo, he looks back and laughs (or wonders) at his momentary *folie*. Now, in that interval between the teams' entrance and the whistle, did Sid believe that Pia was (as they put it in Brussels) playing comedy with him? Here, too, a 'Yes and no' answer may well seem the right one.

The particular cases so far on offer may or may not be convincing. But they point to a general framework within which to cast our present problem. Sid is prepared to say, to others, and to himself, unhesitatingly and with conviction, that Pia is a skilled driver. Such is, grammatically, a state he is in throughout a certain (reasonably extended) interval. He also, regularly, and more than just accidentally, manages to arrange not to be a passenger in a car that Pia is driving. Being one of whom such may be expected is also a state he is in over an extended, and overlapping, interval. That first state (or some state it partly constitutes) is something which may (and would) sometimes (for some purposes, or occasions) count as a person believing that Pia is a skilled driver. Such is one understanding of what believing such a thing might be. That second state (or again some state responsible for it) is what might (and sometimes would) count as a person *not* believing that Pia is a skilled driver. These two states do not compose (at least for Sid). Sid is not in any state which would ever count as believing that Pia is, and furthermore, is not, a skilled driver (if there is any such logically defective state to be in at all). So, where, or when, the first state counts as his believing that Pia is a skilled driver, the second state does not count as his (also, further) not so believing, and vice-versa. But sometimes, for some purposes, on some occasions, his being as he is in being in the first state does count as his so believing; sometimes (for some purposes, on some occasions), his being as he is in being in the second state counts as his *not* so believing. (On pain of contradicting ourselves, we can never count him as both believing and not believing anything.)

Now the idea of believing as attaching an 'I think' to things being some way for things to be is free to operate. If attaching that 'I think' is constitutive of believing—as I have argued that it is—then, for any interval which sometimes counts as Sid believing that P, that very interval also sometimes counts as Sid attaching that 'I think': wherever it counts as the one thing it counts as the other. For any interval which sometimes counts as his not believing that very thing, P, that very interval also sometimes counts as his not attaching that 'I think'. What sometimes counts as his making that P part of *his* thinking as to how things are (his being as he is throughout some relevant interval) sometimes counts as his not so doing. Of course, it never counts as both at once. He never counts as both attaching and not attaching that 'I think', just as he never counts as both *thinking* and not thinking that P. Now let Sid's mental

life be the hell it no doubt is—let it be unbearably convoluted, full of inconsistencies, straining the limits of coherence—and for all that it poses no threat to the work of the first three sections above. One does not make it into a counter-example to that by making it all the harder for him (or anyone close to him) to bear.

4. Pyrrhonian Attitudes: The Pyrrhonians eschewed belief. Nonetheless they saw the need to guide conduct in a way that was responsive, somehow, to the way things are. So they proposed an attitude, called (roughly) *acquiescence in appearance*. Such attitude, the idea was, has the content of a belief. Its object, *what* one could acquiesce in—e.g., that a Porsche approaches—was, they held, what could also be the content of a belief. And it was action-guiding in roughly the way a belief would be: if you held that attitude *in re* approaching Porsche, and if the thing for you to do if a Porsche approached would be to mount the curb, you would then see mounting the curb as the thing for you to do. But the attitude was not belief. One reason, according to them, is that, unlike belief, in holding it one did not expose himself to risk of error. As they put it, if it appeared to me that a Porsche approached, and none did, still, things so appeared to me. Ergo, I was not wrong. One need not agree with the Pyrrhonians that belief is thus dispensable, nor that if it were dispensed with there might be that remainder, ‘acquiescence’, which they supposed. But it is an interesting idea that there can be attitudes towards what *might* be objects of belief, which would guide conduct in much the same way belief would, but which, for all that, are not belief. I will call such attitudes *Pyrrhonian*.

That attitude towards oneself which, in belief, makes representing-as representing-to-be is Pyrrhonian in this sense. For me to hold it (towards P) is for me to see myself as with nothing else to think (but that P), to find my hand forced. It is thus to see myself as occupying that position vis-a-vis things which *is* believing that P. So I thus see myself as thinking that P, that very thing which someone else may *think* me to do. And I guide myself (near enough) accordingly: the thing for me to do or think is, as I see it, what it would be if I thought that P. But since thus seeing myself as with nothing to think *is* occupying that position, this attitude towards myself cannot be *thinking* that I think that P, understanding thinking as a truth-evaluable attitude. My holding it is too close to its object—that which it is towards—for it to have that objectivity which truth demands. A truth, as Frege (nearly) put it, does not become true in being *held*, or even seen to be, true. (See 1918: 69) Our finding ourselves believers, at least where it is *attaching* that ‘I think’, is what fills the space between representing-as and representing-to-be. If it fills the space, the space is thus filled. There is belief. *Thus* is the attitude Pyrrhonian. It is for this that I have spoken above, a bit cagily, of our *finding ourselves*, or *seeing ourselves as*, choiceless, or with hand forced, rather than of our judging, or believing, ourselves so to be.

Frege’s conception of judging carves out a territory for Pyrrhonian attitudes. The territory is marked in one way *via* Frege’s notion of a *Vorstellung*. A *thought* is, or fixes, a question of truth. A question of truth cannot have a bearer. There is no one must be to grasp it, or (thus) to see *how* it makes truth turn on how things are; so nor to see how it participates in the instancing relation—what, in a particular case, would make it, or make it not, a case of things being as per the thought, how a particular case’s being as it is would matter to this. So seeing such things cannot require an acquaintance with particular cases which one would need to be so-and-so to have. So a *Vorstellung*’s being as it is cannot be what makes a particular case relevantly what it is. (Though we could allow, in counterflow, that for some particular case to be what it is just is, by *fiat*, for some *Vorstellung* to be thus and so.)

So marking the territory does not rule *Vorstellungen* out of existence, nor prohibit responses to them, nor ones which take objects of propositional form. Nor even (as we have just seen) with ones towards objects towards which someone *could* take a truth-evaluable attitude. But a response to a *Vorstellung* need not aim at any success which might be truth, and *cannot* so aim without making its success or failure turn in some determinate way on how the environment is. If I have a splitting headache there is an episode (particular case) of pain you would need to be me to feel. So I have a *Vorstellung* in Frege's sense. To borrow from Thomas Nagel, that episode is awful (or so I find). Such may be my *response* to what is a *Vorstellung*. But for the headache to *be* awful, or, if Nagel is right, for it to be *painful*, just is for me so to respond. My response is thus not a *judgement* (in Frege's sense), of some determinate *Vorstellung*, that its being as it is instances some way for a *Vorstellung* to be—it being awful, or painful. My responding as I do is an environmental circumstance. Hence, by the connections thus drawn, my being in pain may be an environmental circumstance. By Frege's point it *must* be if there is to be such a circumstance at all. My being as I am is a particular case which one might judge to fall under (instance) various generalities. If one being in pain is thus an environmental circumstance, it is thereby a generality my being as I am may be judged to instance. But only then is it a way I may be judged to be. And, by the above, so judging is *not* what I do when, responding to what is going on with me by finding it awful, or painful.

There are roles for responses to *Vorstellungen* which only a Pyrrhonian attitude could play, thus reasons for taking some such responses to be Pyrrhonian. One sort of role is: such a response might be creative, constitutive. For example, there may be—and be good reason for there to be—no, or little, gap between my *finding* my head to be splitting (in the sense of the metaphor) and its being so. For one to have a splitting headache may *be* for it to be a certain sort of awful for him. Such might show itself in a sort of immunity to ringers. Where correctness turns on the environment ringers are *ipso facto* in the cards. If Dr. Lauben thinks he is suffering concussion, or eye strain, then, no matter how good a diagnostician he is, there is such a thing as what could not be distinguished by him from concussion, but is not that. By contrast, it is none too easy to see what a perfect illusion of a splitting headache might be. But constitutive roles could have more complex structures. Perhaps, e.g., what Sid really thinks is fixed, not necessarily by what he *would* now say, but by what he is prepared to recognise (at the end of analysis if need be) as the truth about him.

Vorstellungen provide one way of marking out a territory. But there is a way which, viewed one way, is more fundamental. It is contained in Frege's remark.

If man could not think and take for the object of his thinking something of which he was not the bearer, he would have an inner world all right, but not an environment. But can such thinking not rest on a mistake?
... Indeed! With the step by which I win myself an environment I expose myself to risk of error. (1918: 73)

An environmental circumstance is *embedded* in its environment. There is a way its obtaining would matter to how else things were, conversely, a way in which other ways things are matter to whether it obtains. It is, so to speak, embedded in networks of factive meaning. For a question of truth to turn on whether some such circumstance obtains is for it to turn on whether there is anything embedded as the obtaining of that circumstance would be. Whether a Porsche's (or Pia's) being yellow would attract the wrong kind of man is not decided by the *idea* of a yellow Porsche—merely by what might *count* as a Porsche's being yellow. But if, all

considered, Pia's Porsche's being yellow would attract the wrong kind of man, then if her Porsche does no such thing, it is not yellow. The open-endedness of webs of factive meaning does not rule out that one should just see, by looking at it on some occasion, that Pia's Porsche is yellow; that seeing for oneself may be *proof*. Exposing oneself to risk of error, in the sense needed here, need not mean being in any actual danger of it. But it does mean that, for anything having proof might be, there is always room in conceptual space for ringers for this; for unforeseen, but decisive, considerations against so regarding one's having what he does.

Frege makes his remark having argued already that questions of truth arise only where they turn on the (our) environment, thus only for attitudes towards what is embedded in an environment. So the point of the remark is that they arise only for attitudes in which one exposes himself to risk of error in the present sense. It is part of the notion of proof that if I have proof I cannot be wrong. So if seeing for myself is having proof that Pia drives a yellow Porsche—as it may be so far as we know—then if I have seen for myself I cannot be wrong. But suppose the attitude I hold is one *for me* to hold which I could not be holding falsely; such that my holding it rules out my holding it in error—something my taking Pia to drive a yellow Porsche is not. What Frege tells us is that the only way for there to be an attitude which is thus not susceptible to falsehood is for it to be susceptible to *neither* truth nor falsehood.

Vorstellungen, tied as they are to their bearer's consciousness, are not environmentally embedded. So for an attitude to be purely towards them, to turn on nothing more than their being as they are, is one way for an attitude to be immune to falsity. Whether things are as represented *in re Vorstellungen* turns no nothing environmental, or nothing independent of their being so represented. So, within the present framework, it turns on nothing.

Where I see myself as a believer as I do in attaching that 'I think' to, say, it being cherry season, it is natural to trace absence of liability to be seeing falsely to another source. The believing is, of course, *my* believing. So, *inter alia*, it is *presented* to me in a way you would need to be me to be presented to. You may feel compulsion to think that very thing which I thus do (that it is cherry season). But only *I* can feel that instance of the exertion of (rational) compulsion which I thus do. Only I so relate to *my* being so compelled. So, one could say, in so standing towards myself I have a *Vorstellung*. One could try to make that out as a source here of immunity to going wrong which is compatible with getting something *right*.

But immunity to error may also lie in a creative role assigned a response to what is happening to one—to the impression the world then makes—here to the role of *according* a status to a way for things to be as part of one's *own* thinking as to the thing to do or think. Seeing myself as I do in according that statues with hand forced—with nothing else for me to think—*fills* the space between representing-as and representing-to-be. So for me so to see myself is for me to *be* a believer. Or, more cautiously, where I count as so seeing myself I *ipso facto* also count as a believer. Which is why, though my so seeing myself is *judging*, e.g., *that it is cherry season*, it is not *judging* that I so think. I do not *believe* myself to be doing this; I am doing it. Such is a way of incorporating Frege's point about objectivity. *What* I see—the object of my response here—is not something there to see independent of my seeing it it, so not an object of judgement *for me*. In an image of Wittgenstein's, I am rushing forward so cannot observe myself rushing forward. (*Investigations* §456). Indeed not: *observing* is not what I am doing in standing towards myself as I thus do.

Wittgenstein treated believing, as I do here, as an *example* of something. It emerges now as an example of a way for one to be in which a Pyrrhonian attitude is present as an element, and thus plays a certain role. Believing that Pia drives a Porsche is an objective, truth-

evaluable attitude. But taking it involves taking an attitude towards oneself which is not *believing* that one believes, but subscribing in a different way to that being how things are. Now the thing about examples is that one can ask after the others. That is the last topic I will consider here.

5. Scope: The contrast drawn between seeing oneself as a believer in attaching an ‘I think’, and *believing* that one is a believer, is reminiscent in some ways of that between intending to go to Pia’s party and *believing* that, resolutions to avoid it notwithstanding, one will (in the end) succumb to temptation. In both cases, that one will go to the party is the way things are according to him. Intending and believing here guide action similarly. If I really believe that I will go, just as if I intend to go, civility requires me to decline Vic’s invitation to join him at La Bellota Hermosa. But if I change my mind, I did not intend falsely, whereas if I resist temptation then I did believe falsely. Intending does not implicate one with its object in the same way as belief. Perhaps, then, intending, too, is, or involves, Pyrrhonian attitudes.

On the way to introducing his notion of a *Vorstellung* Frege gives a list of things which ‘belong to an inner world’. These include ‘sense-impressions’, creations of our imagination (imaginings, images), sensations, feelings, moods, inclinations, wishes and decisions. Excluding decisions, he brings the rest under the rubric ‘*Vorstellung*’. Perhaps it would be better put to say that *in* having a feeling—say, feeling strongly about Porsche drivers, or feeling moved by Pia’s plight, one encounters, or experiences, or has, *Vorstellungen*. In any event, the role of *Vorstellung* in such things *may* signal a constitutive role there for Pyrrhonian attitudes.

Wittgenstein interested himself in Moore’s anomaly in a series of late manuscripts (around 1946-49), always in the context of a discussion of a wider swathe of mental life—e.g. hope, fear, grief. His swathe overlaps considerably with Frege’s examples of an ‘inner world’. But the bulk of discussion in these manuscripts centres on a family (or perhaps several families) of phenomena which he brings under the rubrics ‘seeing-as’ and ‘seeing aspects’. Frege would have placed some of these under the rubric, ‘Schöpfungen einer Einbildungskraft’ (creations of a power of imagining). Some of these are, or are in part, *perceptual* phenomena (e.g., the Necker cube). The status of some—perhaps the ones which interested Wittgenstein most—is unclear. In this connection he says the following:

Here we must be careful not to think in traditional psychological categories. Such as simply parsing experience into seeing and thinking; or something similar. (*Last Writings* II, §542)

There is a natural line between, as one might call it, receptivity and spontaneity, or presentation—being presented in experience with things to respond to—and response—responding to them. Seeing (where not seeing-that) is presentation. It affords *visual* awareness of what is before one’s eyes—of that pig wallowing, say. Thinking something so is a response to being (or having been) presented with what we were. One can respond to the sight of the pig wallowing in taking, perhaps recognising, there to be a pig wallowing, or that pig to be. Wittgenstein suggests here that some psychological phenomena, and indeed some experiences, do not fall neatly on the one side or the other; that things do not always divide into the categories thus on offer. I have suggested above that belief itself is, or involves, such a case. As such it illustrates one way in which such a case may arise: through the presence of a Pyrrhonian attitude in a creative role. Imagination can provide others. Suppose Pia is

imagining lying on hot sand on a hot day, the heat of the sand penetrating her beach towel and causing all her muscles to relax. Was the sand white or yellow? Was there the sound of surf, or seagulls? Were the seagulls wheeling and diving? It is her story; she gets to tell it. (Within limits of coherence), for the imagined sand to be white just is for her to see things that way. Some of what Wittgenstein calls seeing aspects may be like that. Perhaps, too, *some* of perceptual experience is. Such are topics Wittgenstein thought worth investigating, as so might we.

The categories into which such things might not fit neatly are, as he states them, seeing and thinking. As this underlines, he is not suggesting that seeing and thinking themselves do not fit into those categories presentation and response. But then, not all visual experience is seeing. And not all the experiences which concern him are so much as plainly visual or plainly not—though *one* thing I think he hoped to achieve by study of such more *recherché* phenomena was a better understanding of the relation of seeing to visual experiences which are not that. Perhaps, e.g., the role of Pyrrhonian attitudes in seeing aspects where this is *not* a visual phenomenon can point to a role for them in seeing-as where this *is* visual.

By circuitous route we thus arrive at an area ripe for an investigation which, Mosaically, I will not now enter. One reason for interest in the topic is the particular way in which the fact that not all perceptual experience is *perceiving* has seemed to some to be impressive. What someone saw is bounded by what there was, anyway, to be seen. It is then reduced by what was obscured, or beyond the visual acuity of the observer, or not attended to or registered. What someone experienced visually is not confined within these bounds, nor thus determined. In which orientation he saw the Necker cube, whether it looked to him blurry, or seemed to jump around, are matters to be decided in some other way. The temptation is to take this second category of visual experience, rather than the scene before the eyes, as the base case which gets narrowed down, restricted—perhaps by *ætiology*—into seeing. When I see the tissue box before me, there is anyway, the idea runs, such a thing as the way things then *look* to me, the way experience is, visually, anyway, tissue box or not; with the right causal history (or whatever), things so looking to me will just be my seeing the box.

But suppose now that Pyrrhonian attitudes play some constitutive, creative, role in visual experiences of the second kind. Such would be for some of the work done in fixing *what* was experienced visually, where that is a matter of what was *seen*, to be taken over by such attitudes—by such things as my experience having impressed me as it did. If there is that difference between seeing and other visual experiencing, then it might seem surprising if those two sets of concepts—*perceiving*, and experiencing visually as, or what one does—to line up as they would if, succumbing to temptation, we took the second category as the base case of which, as per above suggestion, seeing forms a proper part. For one thing, how my visual experience *impresses* me—for the cube to *impress* me as jumping, or for it to be *for me* as though it did—is not plausibly a product, or *purely* a product, of *visual* processing (something one might think of as more or less encapsulated). *Thinking*, in some broad sense, must get its due here. Whereas if I see the tissue box, it is plausibly precisely sight, so visual processing, which is to thank for this.

For another, conversely, as soon as we view *it looking to me as though, it being for me as though*, etc., as involving Pyrrhonian attitudes in the way suggested, that picture in which visual experiencing sets the wider bounds, to be narrowed down by *ætiology*, comes to involve a questionable assumption, to wit, that there is such a thing as *the* way things looked to me when I saw the tissue box. Attitudes may take over some of the work done by what was there

to be seen in the case of certain visual experiencing. But there is no reason to suppose that they can do all that the scene before the viewer does, notably, *in re* determinacy. Compare their role in story telling, e.g., writing *policiers*, and in imagining, e.g., Pia daydreaming of strolling on the sands of Ancão. Moreover, if Pyrrhonian attitudes are thus involved constitutively in such visual experiencing, such may dampen the hopes one might have of such experiencing, or its occurrence, reducing to the neurophysiological in ways which *might* have seemed in the cards if visual processing were encapsulated enough. But in all this I merely scout, without prejudging, prospects.

There is a tendency, perhaps Kant-inspired, to read material drawn from, and belonging to, thinking into *all* visual experience, thus all seeing. Succumbing to it, seeing a pig may appear as, *inter alia*, having the pig presented to one *as* a pig, just as seeing the window frame as a swastika, or a cloud as a sheep, is (*if it is*) being presented with the frame *as* a swastika, or etc. Those who think this way see motives for it: were things not so presented, I would be helpless to recognise the pig as a pig. Frege showed why they are wrong to think this. But such is a topic for elsewhere. In any case, though the categories seeing/thinking cannot be imposed neatly on all *Schöpfungen der Einbildungskraft*, still, testing the proper bounds of Pyrrhonian attitudes *may* show that those categories cannot be eroded so as to allow for *such* participation of thought in seeing. Wittgenstein never suggested otherwise.

I hope to have done two things in the above. First, to show how Frege's conception of objectivity provides a useful framework for questions about subjectivity; how he thus contributes significantly to our study, not just of The Mind, but of our minds. Second, to introduce a topic for investigation: the role of Pyrrhonian attitudes in mental life. And now, the better course of valour, for one with so much of the projected work undone, is to pause here.

Bibliography:

- Frege, Gottlob, 1918: "Der Gedanke: Eine Logische Untersuchung", *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus* 2 1918-1919, pp. 58-77.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1953: *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953.
- _____, 1958: *The Blue and Brown Boosk*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.
- _____, 1980: *Remarks On The Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. 1, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
- _____, 1982: *Last Writings*, vol. 1, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.